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POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS. 
By Robert A. Carp and C.K Rowland. Knoxville: University of Ten-
nessee Press. 1983. Pp. x, 203. $17.95. 
This book explores what must be one of the least provocative or 
controversial questions in contemporary American politics. The ques-
tion posed by its authors1 is whether, and to what extent, "extralegal 
cues"2 affect the decision making of federal district judges. That is, do 
federal trial judges reach decisions solely by applying appropriate legal 
precedent to the facts of the case, or do they permit such factors as 
party affiliation and personal beliefs to intrude on and poison their 
pristine legal analysis? 
It cannot be gainsaid that politicians routinely operate on the as-
sumption that judges are unable ( or unwilling) to divorce their politics 
from their decisions. Try to imagine, for example, the following pre-
election exchange between President Reagan and the Reverend Jerry 
Falwell: 
Reverend Falwell: "Mr. President, I understand that you have 100 
district court vacancies to fill. To assist you in this task, I have assem-
bled a list of the most qualified conservative candidates. Appoint these 
men, and those activists presently sitting on the federal bench will no 
longer be able to stifle your political agenda." 
President Reagan: "Well ... thank you Jerry. I appreciate your 
efforts in constructing this impressive list of conservative legal talent. 
Unfortunately, I have serious reservations about accepting your list. 
You see, no one has proven that the actual decisions of conservative 
judges are any more conservative than those of liberal judges. If I 
accept your list, and it turns out that there is no correlation between 
judicial decisions and 'extralegal cues,' I will have needlessly invited 
intense political criticism anq. jeopardized my reelection chances. If 
I'm going to face this political heat, I need to be absolutely certain that 
judicial decisions are affected by the judges' politics. Before accepting 
your list, Jerry, I think the wisest course is to commission a study on 
the subject." 
Certainly, it is difficult to believe that President Reagan would 
commission a study to confirm what is intuitive to most. Whatever the 
book's genesis, our authors begin with the "traditional" theory that 
judicial decisions are solely the function of legal precedent. 3 Under 
1. Robert A. Carp is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Houston. 
Claude Rowland is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kansas. 
2. As the words suggest, "extralegal cues" are those factors extraneous to the legal issues 
involved in a case. With reference to the district court judge, extralegal cues include the judge's 
political affiliation, home state, appointing president, and so forth. Pp. 4-7. 
3. The authors attribute this theory of judicial decision making to "traditional legal schol-
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this "traditional" conception of judicial decision making, the role of 
the judge is limited to fitting mechanically the facts of a given case to 
the prevailing legal guidelines. The ideal result is a fair-minded deci-
sion uncontaminated by the judge's own political values, attitudes or 
prejudices. 
In order to test this romantic notion of judicial even-handedness, 
the authors conducted a massive array of statistical studies. These 
studies purport to show the actual effects of various "extralegal cues" 
on federal trial court decisions (p. 23). The data base consists of 
27,772 district court opinions published in the Federal Supplement 
over a forty-five year period.4 The cases are divided neatly into five 
case types: Criminal Justice, Government and the Economy, Support 
for Labor, Class Discrimination, and First Amendment. 5 Each opin-
ion issued in one of these five areas is characterized as either "liberal" 
or "conservative" depending, not surprisingly, on the outcome. 6 By 
distinguishing between "liberal" and "conservative" decisions and 
controlling for various "extralegal cues," the authors hope to demon-
strate the precise amount of "liberalism" or "conservatism" that can 
be explained by nonlegal factors. Each chapter introduces one or 
more extralegal factors, hypothesizes its probable effect on judicial de-
cision making, and tests its effect statistically.7 The final two chapters 
attempt to synthesize the authors' initial conclusions and to suggest 
possible areas for follow-up research. 
The authors' most interesting findings relate to two of their sug-
gested extralegal cues: the judge's political party affiliation and the 
identity of the president who appointed the judge. The authors begin 
with two premises. First, they surmise that, all other things consid-
ered, Democratic judges will issue a greater percentage of liberal deci-
sions than their Republican counterparts. Second, they predict that 
judges appointed by more "liberal" presidents will produce more "lib-
eral" opinions. 
Not surprisingly, the authors discover that their data support each 
of these bold assertions. What is interesting about the results, how-
ars," but fail to name any of these individuals. Pp. S-6. It is therefore unclear whether the 
authors are alluding to scholarly descriptions of the ideal judicial system, or to legal scholars who 
have actually suggested that judges are able to divorce their peI"'.,onal attitudes from their judicial 
decisions. 
4. To control for the effects of extralegal cues over time, the authors divide the study into 
three periods of approximately equal judicial activity: 1933-19S3, 19S4-1968, 1969-1977. 
5. Dividing the data into types of cases permits the authors to control for the factor of case 
content. This is necessary because certain case types are naturally more "political" than others. 
6. For example, in the criminal justice category, a decision in favor of the defendant is cate-
gorized as "liberal." P. 19. 
7. Chapter 2 examines the influence of political party affiliation. Chapter 3 discusses the 
impact of the appointing president. Chapter 4 measures the effect of region, circuit and state. 
Chapter 5 investigates the relevance of district court size and the level of urbanization in the city 
in which the judge presides. 
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ever, is that the effects of these extralegal cues on judicial decision 
making are far from uniform. For example, while Democratic judges 
did issue a greater quantity of "liberal" decisions from 1933-1977, they 
did so with far greater frequency in the 1969-1977 period than in the 
earlier years. Moreover, while district judges did reflect the political 
values of their appointing presidents, they were far more faithful to 
presidential politics when appointed by Lyndon Johnson or Richard 
Nixon than by Harry Truman, John Kennedy or Gerald Ford. 
The heightened significance of political party affiliation in the 
1969-1977 period, the authors argue, is largely attributable to the in-
consistent pronouncements of the Burger Court (p. 37). The authors 
theorize that when the Supreme Court supplies firm guidelines and 
clear legal precedents, the judges in the lower federal courts have less 
discretion in deciding cases. They must suppress their own political 
beliefs and follow the clear standards articulated by the high court. 
Conversely, when the judges are left without guidance, they are free to 
interject their personal beliefs into the decision-making process. The 
rise in political decision making can therefore be seen as a function of 
a greater opportunity to politicize, rather than a greater desire to do 
so. 
Opportunity is likewise the essential factor in determining the de-
gree to which a district judge will reflect his appointing president's 
political values. Here, however, it is presidential opportunity that is at 
issue. While most presidents would probably like to appoint obedient 
judges, 8 their ability to do so is often circumscribed. Such factors as 
the number of district court vacancies, the need for bipartisan compro-
mise, 9 and the judicial climate10 will determine the extent to which the 
president can assure a dependable judiciary. 
8. The authors argue that some presidents are more concerned than others with nominating 
judges who share their own political orientation. Harry Truman, it is argued, was less concerned 
with appointing ideologues than with rewarding those who had remained personally loyal to him 
in his presidential campaign. P. 54. One suspects, however, that many of those who steadfastly 
supported Truman's campaign also shared his political beliefs. The authors' failure to account 
for this possibility makes it difficult to accept their explanation for why Truman's judicial ap-
pointees exhibited only minimal fidelity to his political agenda. 
9. In order for the president to succeed in placing politically supportive judges on the federal 
bench, he must first succeed in having his appointments confirmed by the Senate. In this section 
of the book, the authors do an excellent job of descn'bing the difficulties a president often en-
counters in dealing with influential, recalcitrant senators. Here, the authors describe the tradi-
tion of "senatorial courtesy," which often permits a senator to block the confirmation of 
nominees to offices in the Senator's home state. P. 60. If the president is too weak politically to 
confront those senators opposed to his nominations, he will be unable to secure a faithful 
judiciary. 
10. The judicial climate at the time of the appointment can easily frustrate the president's 
attempt to mold the federal judiciary. Pp. 62-64. Suppose, for example, that a president under-
takes to nominate a host of conservative district court judges to a federal judiciary dominated by 
liberals. Those nominees who dare depart from the prevailing legal norms run a high risk of 
having their decision overturned. Accordingly, they are forced to restrain their personal beliefs if 
they are to coexist within a judiciary hostile to their ideologies. 
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The authors' ability to proffer cogent explanations for their statisti-
cal :findings is undoubtedly the major strength of their work. To be 
sure, many of their proposed explanations are unsubstantiated. For 
instance, they simply conclude that Burger Court pronouncements 
have been more ambiguous than those of prior Courts. Although this 
may well be in accord with the perception of contemporary legal 
scholars, the authors make no attempt to substantiate the claim. This 
weakness is overshadowed, however, by the enlightening and amusing 
chapter on presidential appointments. Here the authors provide nu-
merous anecdotes that illustrate the limitations on the president's abil-
ity to appoint judicial automatons. 11 While these anecdotes fall short 
of "proving" the authors' assertions, they raise thought-provoking ar-
guments that can be explored in future works. Just as importantly, 
they provide a needed respite from the endless stream of percentages 
and correlation coefficients that dominate the authors' work. 
In the end, unfortunately, there are too few of these thought-pro-
voking illustrations. The bulk of the authors' work consists of present-
ing statistical tables and describing the detailed numerical conclusions 
embodied in those tables. After seven chapters the reader is so over-
whelmed by the sheer magnitude and variety of statistical studies that 
he is incapable of distinguishing one from the other. This appendix-
like format might be useful to those courageous few who envision us-
ing this book as a handy reference tool. It may also serve to allay 
presidential fears that their judicial appointees will shun personal be-
liefs in favor of strict adherence to legal precedent. The book offers 
little, however, to that occasional reader desiring a glimpse at our judi-
cial system. The provocative title, Policymaking and Politics in the 
Federal District Courts, suggests a book that will probe into the human 
elements of decision making in our federal courts. Instead, the book 
responds with an uninspiring conglomeration of numbers that leaves 
the reader with the unfortunate impression that district court deci-
sions are reached by plugging the judge's biographical data into a 
computer. 
11. One of the more interesting anecdotes relates to President Kennedy's efforts to appoint 
Thurgood Marshall to the federal bench. In order to secure Marshall's confirmation, Kennedy 
was forced to compromise with Senator James Eastland, the conservative chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. Allegedly, the price for Marshall's confirmation was the appointment of 
Senator Eastland's college roommate, William Harold Cox, to a district judgeship in Mississippi. 
As a district judge, Cox was openly hostile to civil rights cases; on one occasion he purportedly 
referred to black litigants as "niggers." The great irony, of course, is that Cox was appointed by 
a liberal president widely regarded as a champion of civil rights. Pp. 59-60. 
